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Summary 
Interest representation plays a systemic role in EU policy making and 
integration, recognised as such in the Treaty on European Union. Interest 
organisations supply technical and political information to the EU 
institutions, and EU institutions use interest organisations as agents of 
political communication.  Interest organisations act as a proxy for an 
otherwise largely absent civil society, with a teeming population of groups 
advocating for every imaginable cause.  Where groups are absent, so EU 
institutions have stimulated their formation.  The result is a pluralist 
system of checks and balances, although the literature includes findings of 
‘islands’ resembling corporatist practice. 
 
EU institutions have designed a range of procedures in support of ‘an open 
and structured dialogue between the Commission and special interest 
groups,’ now largely packaged as a ‘Better Regulation’ programme.  
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Measures include funding for NGOs, consultation procedures accompanied 
by impact assessments, a Transparency Register to provide lobbying 
transparency, and measures for access to documents that enable civil 
society organisations to keep EU institutions accountable. A multi-level 
governance system further strengthens pluralist design, making it 
impossible for any one type of interest to routinely capture the diversity of 
EU decision making.  A key controversy in the literature is how to assess 
influence, and whether lobbying success varies across interest group type.  
EU public policy making is regulatory, making for competitive interest 
group politics, often between different branches of business whose 
interests are affected differently by regulatory proposals.  There are 
striking findings from the literature, including that NGOs are more 
successful than business organisations in getting what they want from EU 
public policy making, particularly where issues reach the status of high 
salience where they attract the attention of the European Parliament.  A 
key innovation of the Lisbon Treaty involves a European Citizens’ 
Initiative, which takes dialogue between civil society and EU institutions 
outside the ecosystem inhabited by civil society organisations and EU 






Interest representation has long been identified as a central mechanism in 
European Union (EU) policy-making and integration.  The European 
Commission, and European Parliament, in particular, seek stakeholders 
with shared goals who might be in a position to assist in furthering the 
course of European integration and to help these institutions to achieve 
specific policy goals, sometimes against a backdrop of member states 
reluctant to cede sovereignty to the EU.  During the 1980s, the focus was 
upon achieving a Single European Market (SEM), and the European 
Commission helped to stimulate the formation of stakeholder business 
groups such as the European Round Table of Industrialists, whose 
members (Chief Executive Officers of European domiciled multinationals) 
were well placed to encourage member states to cede the necessary 
powers to the EU (Green Cowles, 1995).  Once a single market, and 
associated infrastructure policies had been achieved, EU institutions 
turned to public interest groups as the agenda shifted from market 
marking to market regulating (Dür, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015).  This 
is because it is regulatory agendas (such as environmental and social 
protection) where shared goals between political institutions and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are likely to arise (Young, 2010).  EU 
institutions often helped to stimulate the formation of groups who could 
become allies, such as the European Environmental Bureau (Mazey and 
Richardson, 2005), Finance Watch (for regulation after the financial 
crisis), and the Platform of European Social NGOs (‘Social Platform’) 
(Kohler Koch, 2012).  Thus, interest groups have been a source of political 
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support, as well as technical information, in the EU political system.  They 
have long held places on various advisory committees that assist the 
European Commission with the formulation of public policy, sitting 
alongside the most frequent category of members, experts from the 
administrations of member states.  The thrust has been to seek to ensure 
that the source of policy information is transparent, pluralised and 
balanced between different types of interests, although these objectives 
are not always met. 
 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) codifies contact between EU 
institutions and civil society in a frame of participatory democracy, 
articulated in a section of the Treaty carrying provisions on democratic 
principles of the EU.  Amongst these, Article 10(3) records that ‘every 
citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the 
union.  Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the 
citizen’.  Article 11(1) states that ‘the institutions shall..give citizens and 
representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly 
exchange their views in all areas of Union action’.  In similar fashion, 
Article 11(2) states that ‘the institutions shall maintain an open, 
transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil 
society’.  Moreover, Article 11(3) states that ‘The Commission shall carry 
out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that 
Union action is coherent and transparent’.  But the frame of participation 
has a different outlook when recast as ‘lobbying’, particularly in the many 
EU member states where the term has pejorative connotations out of 
concern that special interests might be capturing public decision making, 
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or skewing it in favour of those with more resources to undertake lobbying 
activities.  The European Commission’s 1992 paper ‘An Open and 
Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interest Groups’ 
carried a title which conveyed intentions at an early stage to take the 
most from a participatory frame whilst limiting the potential scope for 
harm caused by ‘lobbying’, set in a light touch regulatory framework 
underpinned by transparency and minimum standards for consultation.  
However, most measures only emerged a decade later as part of the 
European Commission’s drive to find popular legitimacy for the EU with its 
landmark ‘White Paper on Governance’ of 2001 (European Commission, 
2001). 
 
The concept and practice of lobbying at EU level has been politicised by 
activist professionalised social movements and NGOs.  This has also 
contributed to the regulated context for lobbying, based around 
transparency, with organisations seeking to influence the public policy of 
EU institutions highly incentivised to join a public ‘Transparency Register’ 
with an associated code of conduct, where lobbying activities, clients (in 
the case of consultancies) and spending (inter alia) are declared.  The 
novel feature of the register is its breadth of scope, taking in 
 
“activities carried out with the objective of directly or indirectly 
influencing the formulation or implementation of policy and decision-
making process of the EU institutions…irrespective of where they are 
undertaken and the channel or medium of communication used” 




This wide-ranging definition, taking in the likes of events aimed at 
influencing the climate of opinion in the EU institutions as well as verbal 
interactions, has been lauded by regulation activists relative to a newly 
proposed definition based around ‘activities which promote certain 
interests’ (Article 3.1, IIA).  Separately, there are also ‘revolving door’ 
provisions placing restrictions on Commissioners and senior officials taking 
up positions within 24 months of leaving office.  Additionally, European 
Commissioners, members of their cabinets, and those of the rank of 
Director General of the Commission, have to publicly disclose their 
meetings with specific lobby organisations within 14 days. Transparency 
International have taken these declarations a stage further at its own 
initiative by collating the data to their interactive ‘EU Integrity Watch’ 
website1. There, observers can manipulate the data in order to see who 
are the most regular lobby organisations on which topics, and which 
Commission senior figures holds the most meetings with lobby 
organisations.  At the time of writing, the Transparency Register is subject 
to revision, with an inter-institutional agreement dating from 2016 
providing the centrepiece for discussion.  One of the most notable 
features involves the inclusion for the first time in the scheme of the 
Council of Ministers, albeit only at the level of the General Secretariat and 
the rotating Presidency, and not the permanent representations of 
member states.  Other omissions seem likely to involve whether inclusion 
on the register should be a pre-condition for a meeting with an MEP, and 





an aspiration among activists that meetings at the operational level (i.e. 
below that of Director General) of the European Commission be subject to 
declarations.   
 
There are other transparency related regimes governing EU institutions 
engagement with civil society, and measures for consultation standards, 
each covered later.  Another measure to achieve ‘an open and structured 
dialogue’ involves funding for NGOs working at EU level, which has been 
subject to contention on the grounds that it may instrumentalise civil 
society organisations (Hannan, 2010).  Some (mainly transnational) NGOs 
(such as Amnesty International, and Greenpeace), refuse to seek EU 
funding on the grounds that it might create such a perception.  At the 
other end of the spectrum, some commentators see EU funding as the 
enabler of an ‘associative democracy’ (Sanchez Salgado, 2014) which 
gives a voice to marginalised groups and issues, and helps to address 
imbalances in interest representation.  In this guise, EU funding avoids 
the need to seek donations from corporate sources with the risks to 
independence this may bring, and helps to sustain a healthy and diverse 
population of interest groups in Brussels.  This presence can act as an 
accountability agent in a political system that is based around consensus, 
with organised civil society playing the role of an ‘unofficial opposition’ to 
EU institutions in a political system that lacks one.  For instance, 
according to the EU’s Financial Transparency System database2, Friends of 
the Earth Europe received around €1.5million in EU funding in 2016, yet 





any visit to its website will find evidence of vigorous criticism of EU 
policies.  Similarly, the European Environmental Bureau received €21.5 
million from the EU in 2017, but this has not prevented it from litigating 
against the Commission in the European Court of Justice.  Nonetheless, 
the potential constraints are illustrated by a policy decision of the 
European Women’s Lobby not to litigate against the Commission in view 
of the funding it receives from that source (Sanchez Salgado, 2014). 
 
A Market Place of Ideas? 
 
An EU interest group population along pluralist lines is sought by EU 
institutions, aimed at ensuring the articulation of interests and counter-
veiling interests in a public EU policy debate, where diversely comprised 
interest groups act as a proxy for an otherwise absent public.  In this 
guise, what matters is the establishment of a wide range of groups, with 
little sense in placing barriers to the formation of groups through 
accreditation criteria (Kohler Koch, 2010).  Whilst there is no authoritative 
count of the number of groups active at EU level, the Transparency 
Register provides a head-count of organisations (and self-employed 
individuals).  Here, the main incentives to join the register involve access 
to apply for a one-year pass to European Parliament buildings, the 
requirement to be on the register in order to get access to senior levels in 
the Commission, and to be a member of a Commission Expert/Advisory 
group or to be invited to an expert hearing at the European Parliament.  
11,820 entities are currently3 on the register, although this is not an 
                                       
3 Figures as of 11.9.2018 
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authoritative figure as access to the register is by self-publication (albeit 
with meta oversight) and organisations have diverse reasons (including 
publicity seeking) to publish an entry, not all connected with EU lobbying.  
Universities, and some regional government authorities, sit alongside 
some unusual bedfellows from far-flung corners of the globe as well as the 
‘usual suspects’ of core lobbying organisations established at EU level with 
a Brussels base.  NGOs and an active media at EU level provide oversight 
of the Register, drawing to the attention of the EU institutions potential 
data errors. The ‘usual suspects’ include the number of organisations with 
an office in Brussels (3751) (some of which are Belgian national 
organisations), and the number of individuals who have an access pass to 
the European Parliament buildings (7068).  These figures may provide the 
best available estimate of active lobbyists, if partially incomplete because 
they exclude lobbyists travelling from the member states for infrequent 
visits.  According to Transparency Register data, there are four 
consultancies, three trade associations and one company (Google) which 
spend more than €5 million on lobbying EU institutions.  Most of this is 
accounted for by staff costs, with 154 organisations reporting employing 
25 full-time equivalent staff or more engaged in EU lobbying activities. 
 
A key debate has been whether there is biased representation in practice 
towards one type of interest or another.  Activist groups point to the 
greater number of entries in the producer categories on the EU 
Transparency Register and elsewhere, but this fails to take into account 
                                       
4 68 organisations report doing so, but once ‘wildcard’ entries (such as the 
inclusion of a total workforce) are stripped out as well as think tanks, around 15 
core EU lobbying organisations are included. 
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the ways in which business interests have different preferences over the 
detail of regulatory standards, often pitching one segment of business 
interests against another in competitive lobbying battles.  For instance, 
car parts suppliers are supportive of a high regulatory standard for 
reduction in CO² emissions as they have the technologies to produce the 
standard, whereas car producers don’t want to bear the costs and prefer 
lower regulatory standards.  Car producers are divided on how much this 
matters, as producers of smaller cars have an easier time meeting the 
emission standards than large car producers. Intra-business competition 
can even take place at the level of the firm, with different product 
divisions in a single company affected in diametrically opposite ways, 
leaving multinationals mute (Hart, 2010).  Activist groups have also 
similarly made the Commission’s Expert and Advisory groups the subject 
of considerable scrutiny, focusing on overall numbers of business 
members and case studies of imbalance (Vassalos, n.d.), although other 
analyses have found an overall more pluralistic composition when 
examining the total population of groups (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2011). 
 
At the systemic level, the EU has a pluralist design that makes it difficult 
for regulatory capture.  Its three legislative institutions are diversely 
constituted, with 28 Member States, 8 political parties, and 34 policy 
departments of the European Commission.  There have been claims that 
business interests are more successful in their lobbying (Dür and De 
Bièvre, 2007), whilst Klüver finds that lobbying success does not vary 
systematically across interest group type (Klüver, 2012).  Greenwood 
found that cohesion within policy sectors was a strong predictor of 
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business unity, with highly concentrated (fewer interests to organise) 
commodity product sectors (where the nature of the product is not a 
source of differentiation, e.g. chlorine, petrol) the most cohesive 
(Greenwood, 2002).  The ability of NGOs to work together in coalitions, 
often sharing back-office facilities in ‘NGO houses’ in Brussels, bely a 
greater degree of shared outlooks among NGOs than business 
organisations. Trade Unions also have a higher degree of cohesion than 
pan-business interests (Greenwood, 2017).  At the case study level, there 
are contradictory findings.  Kurzer and Cooper’s claims of bias towards 
business demands on the renowned EU food information labelling 
legislation has a counter retort by Hoff et al, who found that the European 
Parliament changed the file in favour of consumer interests in a significant 
number of ways (Kurzer and Cooper, 2013; Hoff et al, 2015).  Individual 
authors have also changed their position on the question of interest group 
influence, switching from seeing a bias of business influence (Dür and De 
Bièvre, 2007) to a more pluralist outlook.  Thus, Dür et al undertook an 
analysis of the positions of more than 1,000 non-state actors on 70 
legislative acts proposed by the European Commission between 2008 and 
2010, strikingly finding NGOs to be more successful than business 
organisations in achieving their policy goals, (Dür, Bernhagen and 
Marshall, 2015).   Boräng and Naurin similarly found that 
 
“the common picture of Brussels – and in particular the Commission 
– of being in the hands of big business is not confirmed by this 
study.  On the contrary, civil society actors are more likely to share 
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views with the Commission officials of what is at stake in legislation 
compared to business.”  Boräng and Naurin, 2015, 514) 
 
Dür et al, and Boräng and Naurin, found that business interests were only 
successful where conflict is low and issues remain technical and below the 
radar of public saliency in the European Parliament.  Dür and Mateo found 
that interest groups frame issues that resonate in public opinion, 
encouraging an active public, bringing in other like-minded interest groups 
to the fray, and deterring lobbying by business groups (Dür and Mateo, 
2014). A shared norm in the study of interest groups anywhere is that the 
salience of an issue is a key predictor of ‘who wins’ in lobbying battles; 
where salience is high, so public interests tend to be more successful as 
they encourage political institutions to follow public opinion.  Klüver et al 
place emphasis on contextual factors, including the salience and 
complexity of an issue, as well as whether a change to the status quo is 
involved, the type of policy (which regulatory policies producing 
competitive interest group politics), and the size of coalitions (where 
larger coalitions are more successful) (Klüver, Braun & Beyers, 2015).  
These factors were also considered by Mahoney in a comparison between 
the United States and the European Union (Mahoney, 2007).  Key 
differences which emerge are that the European Commission’s legislative 
monopoly means that its policy proposals almost always lead to a policy 
outcome, whereas in the US, where a Member of Congress can propose an 
initiative, few initiatives end up as law, not least because of the rule 
whereby if a proposal does not move forward in the two year 
Congressional session, it is automatically deleted and needs to be 
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reintroduced.  EU policy proposals are more likely to lead to legislative 
compromises because of the diversity of components in legislative 
institutions, whereas the US is more likely to be based on a ‘winner takes 
all’ scenario.  In the US, private funding of election campaigns create 
incentives for elected officials to be more responsive to donors (Mahoney, 
2007). 
 
Whilst one set of authors contend that interest group type (business, 
NGOs etc.) matters in explaining policy outcomes (Dür, Bernhagen and 
Marshall, 2015); Klüver contends to the contrary with her emphasis on 
contextual factors (Klüver et al, 2015) in explaining policy outcomes.  
There is also a lively debate about the methodologies of assessing 
influence (Dür, 2008; Klüver, 2013; Bunea and Ibenskas, 2015; Klüver, 
2015).  On the basis that access is a pre-condition for influence, one 
indicator has been to assess levels of access to EU institutions, theorised 
in terms of the supply of and demand for access goods such as technical 
and/or political information (Bouwen, 2004).  This method has its critics, 
not least because of the chasm presented between political access and 
influence.  Dür identifies three methods of assessing influence: process 
tracing, assessing attributed influence, and gauging the degree of 
preference attainment.  The first of these, process tracing, seeks to 
‘uncover the steps by which causes affect outcomes’ (Dür, 2008: 562), 
but the identification and interpretation of these raises its own problems, 
as well as issues of generalisability from a single or small number of 
cases.  Attributed influence involves surveys of self-assessment or that by 
well-informed observers, but is inevitably subjective.  Preference 
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attainment compares policy outcomes with stated preferences, but which 
may reveal little about cause and effect. 
 
Pluralism and Corporatism 
 
An early strand to the literature debated whether there could be a 
corporatist mode of interest intermediation at EU level (Greenwood, Grote 
and Ronit, 1992; Obradovic, 1995; Gorges, 1996; Falkner, 1998).  This 
was stimulated by a keynote article from pioneers of corporatist analysis, 
which concluded that the conditions for corporatism were not present at 
EU level because of the lack of ‘state-like’ properties of EU institutions 
(Streeck and Schmitter, 1991). Whilst there was little dispute that 
corporatism did not exist at the systemic level, the literature sometimes 
found ‘islands’ or features which resembled corporatist practice at EU 
level, particularly in the field of labour market (‘social’) policy where some 
actors assumed responsibility for the implementation of policy goals.  A 
‘social partnership’ involving bilateral dialogue between business and 
labour groups was institutionalised in the EU Treaties in the 1990s, which 
bestowed powers upon representative groups to conclude agreements 
which would become legislation, fuelled much interest among observers 
(Compston and Greenwood, 2003) but few tangible results.  The European 
Commission briefly (1997; 2001) flirted with the idea of a system that 
would give special privileges to groups that could ‘demonstrate their 
representativeness and capacity to lead debates’ (European Commission, 
1997; 2000).  This was soon abandoned because of the difficulties 
experienced from social partnership in establishing and assessing 
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measures of ‘representativeness,’ let alone ‘leadership’, and because the 
idea found widespread disfavour, not least from the European Parliament.  
Nonetheless, civil society groups have organised themselves into ‘families’ 
(such as the Green10 group of ten environmental NGOs working at EU 
level) for regular (up to bi-monthly) meetings with the European 
Commission, whose boundaries of membership are patrolled by the 
family, and whose members take on funded projects for EU institutions.  
In these respects, aspects resembling corporatist practice can be found in 
pockets at EU level, even if corporatism at the systemic level is unlikely, 
and a systemic level of pluralism preferred.  Commentators have used the 
qualification of ‘elite pluralism’ (Coen, 1998; Eising, 2007) and ‘chameleon 
pluralism’ (Coen and Katsaitis, 2013) to characterise the relationship 
between EU institutions and organised civil society.   
 
The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance of 2001 
(European Commission, 2001), focused on finding legitimacy for the 
European Union, gave rise to a series of procedures to structure the 
dialogue with outside interests in the frame of a participatory democracy.  
These procedures have gradually evolved into a collective package known 
and prioritised during the current term (2014-2019) of the European 
Commission as a ‘Better Regulation Agenda’, part of which is about 
removing legislation deemed as unnecessary, and part of which ‘is about 
designing and evaluating EU policies and laws transparently, with 
evidence, and backed up by the views of citizens and stakeholders’ 
(European Commission, 2018a).  In a signal of its priority, the agenda is 
chaired by the Senior Vice President of the European Commission.  Better 
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Regulation also has as one of its core objectives the systematic evaluation 
of EU legislation under its Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT) 
programme, and is open to the public for suggestions as to how to 
streamline EU legislation. 
 
Better Regulation involves a set of procedures from evaluation to policy 
inception.  The Commission issues a public Legislative Work Programme a 
year in advance, to give all stakeholders notice of upcoming legislation.  
Initial ideas, called ‘roadmaps’ and ‘inception impact assessments’, are 
open for feedback for 4 weeks.  These are followed by public 
consultations, open on a dedicated website for a response period of 12 
weeks.  Once the European Commission has finalised its legislative 
proposal and submitted it to the European Parliament and Council, there 
is a further consultation period of 8 weeks, following which the 
contributions will be passed on to the Parliament and the Council.  Where 
the legislation involves draft delegated and implementing acts, the 
consultation period is open for 4 weeks. 
 
How might the Better Regulation agenda be classified?  Are the 
procedures primarily about the technical quality of public policy (output 
legitimacy), or are they more about the legitimacy which comes from 
opportunities to participate in the shaping of public policy (input 
legitimacy).  Schmidt introduces a special category, ‘throughput 
legitimacy’, which is about the robustness and quality of the procedural 
measures themselves, and which she uses to characterise the EU system 
of engagement with outside interests (Schmidt, 2013).  This has its 
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advantages, because it contains elements of both output legitimacy and 
input legitimacy, whilst distinguishing itself from both.  Another 
adaptation is a preference for the term ‘participatory governance’, as 
distinct from the challenging criteria for the presence of a ‘participatory 
democracy’ (Kohler Koch and Quittkat, 2013), in which governing with the 
participation of stakeholders is central.    There is a debate as to whether 
procedures simulate political competition and contestation by a wide 
range of participants, or constrain civil society organisations by forcing 
them to operate within the confines of EU institutions in a system of 
participatory governance, in which consensus seeking is the overarching 
principle (Kohler Koch, 2012). 
 
Alongside the Better Regulation package, a central measure that 
underpins the relationship between political institutions and civil society is 
transparency.  Article 15 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) states that ‘In order to promote good governance and 
ensure the participation of civil society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible.’  
Expert and Advisory groups now have a register on Europa, where 
members (and any potential conflicts of interest) are identified.  The 
Transparency Register was another plank in the transparency regime, but 
perhaps of greatest significance was the introduction by EU institutions in 
2001 of a Regulation on Access to Documents, which provided a means of 
addressing information asymmetries between EU institutions and civil 
society.  The measure is enshrined in Article 42 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, as well as Article 15(3) of the TFEU. It 
18 
 
allows any EU legal person to request documents held by EU institutions, 
subject to certain safeguards, and to receive a reply within 15 working 
days.  Most requests are made of the European Commission, to whom, in 
2016 there were just over 6,000 applications for access to documents.   
 
Given the potential for the measure to contribute to political 
accountability, it is worth examining the sources of requests for access to 
documents.  The Commission estimates that almost 40% of requests 
came from citizens, 21% from academic institutions and think tanks, 
13.5% from legal professionals, 12% from civil society organisations, 10% 
from companies, and 6% from journalists (European Commission, 2017).  
Over time, there has been an increase in use of the mechanism by 
citizens, reflecting its greater familiarity by an elite public.  A specialised 
NGO (Access Info Europe) has established a web site, ‘Ask the EU.org’, to 
facilitate use of the instrument and dissemination of its results.  In 2016, 
full access to the requested documentation was given in almost 61% of 
cases, rising to more than 80% when partial access was given.  Those 
who are dissatisfied with the outcome may take a case to the European 
Ombudsman, who fielded 21 complaints against the Commission’s 
handling of requests for access to documents in 2016.  The Ombudsman 
office has always been particularly active on cases involving transparency, 
often working closely with transparency activist NGOs to expand the 
boundaries of regimes (Greenwood, 2014).  The boundaries have been 
centred on the interpretation of various grounds to deny access, of which 
the most politicised are for the protection of international relations, and 
the integrity of the EU decision-making process. There have also been a 
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number of cases that have reached the General Court of the European 
Court of Justice, whose judgements have generally favoured the 
appellant.  The measure has been applied retroactively, i.e. to documents 
before 2001, and to documents originating with third parties.  Collectively, 
these factors help to redress information asymmetries between political 
institutions and civil society, and enable civil society organisations to keep 
EU institutions accountable. 
 
An open and structured dialogue?: Consultation 
 
A centrepiece in the Better Regulation package involves the procedures for 
consultation, based in Article 11(3) of the TEU, as well as an annexed 
protocol to the Treaties which states that ‘before proposing legislative acts 
‘the Commission shall consult widely’.  Consultations are an embedded 
component of impact assessments, which accompany each legislative 
proposal.  A Commission Communication on consultation standards dating 
from 2002 states that the guiding principle for the Commission is that of 
‘a voice but not a vote’. There are various instruments for consultation, 
ranging from White and Green Papers, questionnaires, expert and public 
hearings, and citizens’ dialogues, but the cornerstone of most 
consultations involves the use of 12 week open public consultations on a 
dedicated website on Europa, accounting for 92% of all impact 
assessments in 2017 (European Commission, 2018b).  A glance through 
these at any one time demonstrates how technical most of the subjects 
are on which legislation is proposed, suited for expert audiences rather 
than a wider public audience, but occasionally a consultation grabs public 
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attention.  The most responses to a public consultation were 4.5 million, 
in 2018, on the subject of abolishing harmonisation of daylight saving 
time.  Many such subjects tend to grab the imagination in a particular 
member state, with, for instance, Germany accounting for around 70% of 
the responses on daylight saving.  On more technical subjects, the 
Commission will select from the responses to the open public consultation 
the main stakeholders, and unique mainstream contributions, and draw 
the contributors together for a detailed technical policy discussion.  In 
2017, 89% of impact assessments had consultations targeted at particular 
groups of stakeholders and additional to the open public consultation 
(European Commission, 2018b).  A Regulatory Scrutiny Board, comprised 
of seven full time external and internal members, monitors the quality of 
consultations undertaken, with powers to require the Commission to 
repeat unsatisfactory elements of the consultation.  The Board’s 
assessments are made public; it issued negative assessments for 43% of 
impact assessments in 2017, with failings corrected at the second attempt 
in many of these cases (European Commission, 2018b).  A policy proposal 
cannot proceed without an approved impact assessment.  At the 
conclusion of the consultation process, the European Commission is 
supposed to publish a report on the consultation exercise, which in its 
best guise would give justifications for policy choices made on the basis of 
input during the consultation phase, and in doing so contribute to input 
legitimacy.  The responses to the consultations should also be published.  
In 2017, 92% of impact assessments reported on consultation findings.  
However, earlier studies have found the implementation of consultation 




Taken as a whole, the measures create ‘an open and structured dialogue’ 
between the Commission and special interest groups, with oversight,   
providing for a pluralistic system of interest representation populated by a 
diverse range of interest organisations in the ‘Brussels microcosm’.  
Organisations with a Brussels base have the ability to collect policy 
relevant information, increasingly through formal procedural channels.  An 
important exception involves ‘Trilogues’ – three way dialogues between 
the European Parliament, Council of Ministers, and European Commission 
– which are an informal means of inter-institutional conflict resolution 
used to reach early legislative agreement on almost all files, held in a 
secluded setting, typically over the course of three to four meetings.  The 
share of co-decision files adopted in first reading rose from 28% in in the 
1999-2004 legislature to 84% in the 2014-19 legislature (European 
Parliament, 2017).  Their secluded nature is problematic, because there is 
no public sight of the trade-offs which are made between the institutions.  
It also means that networks of contacts are the main way of acquiring 
information as to the progress of a legislative file, privileging those with a 
base in Brussels over those trying to follow legislative files from the 
member states.  EU institutions may involve civil society organisations in 
legislative files when they are seeking to influence the position of other 
institutions during the course of trilogue negotiations.  This is commonly 
the case with the European Parliament, with a finely tuned political 
antenna, whose negotiators enter into trilogue agreements with an 
approved (at committee and plenary level) negotiating mandate.  As the 
people’s tribune, the European Parliament prioritises public facing issues 
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in a legislative file, tending to give way to the Council on technical issues 
that are less amenable to public discussion (Roederer-Rynning and 
Greenwood, 2017).  Rasmussen finds that the influence of civil society 
organisations in the European Parliament is variable.  Over four case 
studies, Rasmussen examined the influence of business in the European 
Parliament, and found it to vary by a number of factors.  These include 
the degree of business unity over an issue, the extent of salience (where 
business influence is greater over issues of low public salience), and the 
extent of experience of the individual committee of the European 
Parliament with the co-decision making procedure.  Where a committee 
was an established co-decision committee it was more used to playing the 
role of the legislator and thus more likely to adopt moderate positions, 
whereas where a committee was new to co-decision it may be stuck in the 
mind-set of opposition because it lacked the responsibility of its positions 
become legislation.  In these circumstances, committees with less co-
decision experience than others would be less likely to take up positions 
that were favourable to business (Rasmussen, 2014). 
 
The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) 
 
The significance of the public salience of issues to the functioning of the 
EU political system is present in attempts by EU institutions to improve 
participative legitimacy.  Article 11(4) of the Treaty on European Union 




Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant 
number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the 
European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit 
any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a 
legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the 
Treaties. 
 
These powers make it an agenda-setting measure only, bearing little 
comparison with measures to be found elsewhere (such as in California) 
where there is compulsion upon political institutions to act.  Nonetheless, 
its limited powers are to be understood in terms of a comparison with the 
limited powers of the European Parliament to initiate legislation; it was a 
deliberate design feature of the ECI that its powers of initiation should not 
exceed those of the European Parliament (Karatzia, 2017; Vogiatzis, 
2017).  It also has significance in being the world’s first transnational 
initiative  Five initiatives have to date achieved the threshold of 1 million 
signatures on a subject ‘within the framework of EU powers’ within 12 
months, from a minimum of 7 member states (with weighted thresholds 
per member state).  Reaching such a status gives the organisers the right 
to a meeting with the European Commission, and subsequently to a public 
hearing in the European Parliament.  In none of these cases was the 
Commission able to completely meet the demands of ECI organisers, but 
in two cases (Right to Water; Ban Glyphosate) the Commission committed 
to actions related to the demands of the campaign.  The significance of 
the measure may lie more in the effects of public campaigning for 
signature collection, and the breadth of issues they bring to EU politics.  
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There are five initiatives currently open for support, 26 failed to reach the 
signature threshold, and 15 initiatives were withdrawn by the organisers.  
Seasoned observers of the initiative estimate that it takes five 
conversations to convert into one signature (Greenwood and Tuokko, 
2017). 8 million signatures have so far been collected by ECIs, making for 
an estimated 40 million conversations on EU related issues in the member 
states. Subjects introduced by ECIs are more diverse than those routinely 
proposed by the European Commission, including calls: to legalise 
cannabis; for an end to the caging of animals; for a permanent status to 
EU citizenship; for an end to hunger; measures to help refugees; stop 
plastic in the sea; protecting the institutions of marriage and the family; 
equal treatment for all transport workers; an end to front companies; the 
European free vaping initiative; and criminalising ecocide. 
 
The legal framework of the ECI is set up for transnational campaigning, 
with the requirement for registration being the establishment of an 
organising Citizens’ Committee comprising seven citizens from seven 
different member states.  This makes the measure ideally suited to 
students and recent students, and particularly ERASMUS students with a 
range of transnational contacts and a transnational outlook.  The 
members of Citizens Committees are disproportionately in the 21-30 year 
age bracket (European Parliament Research Service, 2015).  The ECI is 
appealing to this age cohort with its opportunities for experimentation and 
adventure, transnational fellowship, public campaigning, the deployment 
of discourse, communication and e-skills (Greenwood, 2019).  They have 
brought largely new campaigns and new campaign teams to the EU policy 
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agenda (Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, 2014), although inevitably some 
campaigns have their origin with civil society organisations working at EU 
level.  In the early days, the European Commission actively discouraged 
Brussels based NGOs established at EU level from launching initiatives 
(EurActiv, 2011), in the hope that new campaigners would come forward.  
Bouza Garcia and Greenwood found that consensual campaigns were 
more likely to be associated with campaigners well linked to EU politics, 
whereas outsiders were more likely to introduce topics that challenged the 
direction of travel of EU public policy (Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, 
2014).  Greenwood and Tuokko found a notable reach of campaigns in 
central and East European countries (Greenwood and Tuokko, 2017).  All 
these features make the ECI an added value attempt to stimulate 
transnational public debate.   Van de Steg argues that ‘public spheres 
emerge through the public debate of controversial issues…the more we 
debate issues, the more we engage each other in our public discourses, 
the more we actually create political communities; (van de Steeg, 2010, 
p.39).  The ECI does not by itself create a new European public sphere, 
but it does enable citizens to debate the same issues at the same time 
across national boundaries, which is one of the pre-conditions that 
Habermas sets for the formation of a transnational public sphere 
(Habermas, 1995).  Moreover, it has certainly taken EU politics outside of 
the ‘Brussels bubble’. 
 
The European Commission has been keen for the ECI to work in a number 
of ways.  It is one of the ten strategic priorities of the Juncker 
Commission.  Successful initiatives have their measure placed on the 
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agenda of the College of Commissioners.  The Commission provides a 
translation service for each of the EU’s 24 official languages.  The 
Commission will part-register initiatives where only part of it falls within 
the legal competency for the EU to act, rather than refusing registration 
entirely to those initiatives where part falls outside of Treaty 
competencies.  Moreover, in the early days of the measure, the 
Commission lent its servers to campaigners collecting signatures.  In its 
2017 legislative reform proposal, new measures include harmonising the 
age of eligibility to sign an initiative to 16 years (currently only done in 
Austria), and a common internet platform for signature collection which 





‘An open and structured dialogue between the Commission and special 
interest groups’ has gradually been built since the 1990s, accelerating 
from the 2001 White Paper on Governance.  The procedures to deliver this 
share a core denominator of transparency.  The Transparency Register 
makes it known to the public who these groups are, what they are doing, 
and how many resources they are devoting to lobbying.  Consultation 
procedures make known the responses received, and how the Commission 
reacts to them.  Moreover, the Access to Documents measure empowers 
civil society organisations to acquire documents from EU Institutions 
within 15 days of asking for them, addressing asymmetries and enabling 
an elite public to keep political institutions accountable.  A system of 
27 
 
funding makes a teeming population of NGOs possible at EU level, 
apparently without instrumentalising NGOs, providing checks and balances 
upon producer organisations, and upon EU institutions themselves, 
playing the role of ‘unofficial opposition’ in an otherwise consensus bound 
system.  NGOs are ready partners for EU institutions in an era when the 
EU agenda has shifted from market making to market regulating, 
providing political support as well as expert information.  This axis has 
delivered European integration (Green Cowles, 1995).  NGOs provide a 
proxy for an otherwise absent civil society, enabling the fulfilment of 
Article 11 on the Treaty on European Union for ‘an open, transparent and 
regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society’.  A 
mature landscape of coalition between NGOs is evident.  All of the 
measures for ‘an open and structured dialogue’ have aimed at resembling 
a participatory democracy based around a market place of ideas built on 
pluralist principles, whilst at the same time seeking to filter out the worst 
that ‘lobbying’ can bring to a political system.  The weight of evidence 
suggests that the EU political system has avoided biased representation, 
with regulatory policies in which the EU specialises typically producing 
competitive interest group politics, and a multi-level governance system 
that defies routine regulatory capture by any one type of special interest.  
An innovation to EU participatory democracy involves the European 
Citizens’ Initiative, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, which has opened up 
a new channel of dialogue between EU institutions and civil society which 
is not dependent upon organised civil society in the ‘Brussels bubble’ to 
operationalise it.  Whilst the ECI has no powers of mandate, it has 
broadened the EU policy agenda, and brought EU debates, sometimes 
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contentious, directly to citizens in the member states, with over 8 million 
citizen signatures to initiatives, and numerous more conversations to 
achieve those signatures.  It is an added value addition to a pluralist 
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